Something for Everyone? - The Future of Comprehensive Criminal Justice Initiatives after Senate v. Jones and Manduley v. Superior Court by Moylan, Mary-Beth
McGeorge Law Review
Volume 33




Something for Everyone? - The Future of
Comprehensive Criminal Justice Initiatives after
Senate v. Jones and Manduley v. Superior Court
Mary-Beth Moylan
University of the Pacific; McGeorge School of Law
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.pacific.edu/mlr
Part of the Law Commons
This Symposium is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals and Law Reviews at Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion
in McGeorge Law Review by an authorized editor of Scholarly Commons. For more information, please contact mgibney@pacific.edu.
Recommended Citation
Mary-Beth Moylan, Something for Everyone? - The Future of Comprehensive Criminal Justice Initiatives after Senate v. Jones and Manduley v.
Superior Court, 33 McGeorge L. Rev. 779 (2002).
Available at: https://scholarlycommons.pacific.edu/mlr/vol33/iss4/12
Something for Everyone? The Future of Comprehensive
Criminal Justice Initiatives After Senate v. Jones and
Manduley v. Superior Court
Mary-Beth Moylan*
TABLE OF CONTENTS
I. IN TRO D U CTIO N ............................................................................................. 779
II. HISTORY OF THE SINGLE-SUBJECT RULE AND THE REASONABLY-
G ERM A N E T EST ............................................................................................ 78 1
III. JUDICIAL REVIEW OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE INITIATIVES PRE-SENATE
V. J O N E S ........................................................................................................ 7 8 2
A. Brosnahan v. Eu and Brosnahan v. Brown ............................................ 783
B . R aven v. D eukm ejian ............................................................................. 786
IV. ADDING TEETH TO THE SINGLE-SUBJECT RULE? SENATE V. JONES ............. 788
A . P re-E lection R eview ............................................................................... 789
B. Merits of the Single-Subject Rule Challenge ......................................... 791
V. THE FIRST POST-JONES CHALLENGE: MANDULEY V. SUPERIOR COURT ....... 794
VI. DRAFTING COMPREHENSIVE CRIMINAL JUSTICE INITIATIVES IN THE
F U T U R E ......................................................................................................... 8 0 1
V II. C O N CLU SIO N ................................................................................................ 803
I. INTRODUCTION
The initiative has a special place in the constitutional structure and politics of
California. The California Supreme Court has repeatedly referred to its "solemn
duty jealously to guard the sovereign people's initiative power, 'it being one of
the most precious rights of our democratic process."" Based on the special nature
of this right, the initiative power has been "liberally construed" regardless of the
subject matter of the initiative, and it historically has been particularly "liberally
* Instructor of Legal Process, University of the Pacific, McGeorge School of Law; B.A., Oberlin
College, 1991; J.D., Case Western Reserve University, 1994. 1 would like to thank Ruth Jones, Elizabeth
Fenton, and especially Marc Le Forestier.
1. Raven v. Deukmejian, 52 Cal. 3d 336, 341 (1990) (quoting Amador Valley Joint Union High Sch.
Dist. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 22 Cal. 3d 208, 248 (1978)).
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construed" in matters involving criminal justice initiatives. Perhaps the sentiment
originating in Brosnahan v. Brown3 and quoted in Raven v. Deukmejian4 best sums
up the reason for the exceedingly expansive reach afforded to criminal justice
initiatives: "In our democratic society in the absence of some compelling,
overriding constitutional imperative, we should not prohibit the sovereign people
from either expressing or implementing their own will on matters of such direct
and immediate importance to them as their own perceived safety."5 This sentiment
extends to all aspects of the initiative process.
Proposing and passing an initiative is an enormous undertaking and one that
increasingly requires vast financial resources.' The temptation to undertake
comprehensive reforms, rather than piecemeal modifications to existing law, is
great both because of the cost of accessing the initiative process and because
there is an opportunity for coalition-building and greater ease of passage when
more than one related change is presented to the electorate. It goes without
saying that proponents do not want to place a measure on the ballot that does not
have a substantial chance of success. As one consequence of the financial and
other resources required to successfully navigate a measure into law through the
initiative process, recent decades have seen an increase in initiatives seeking to
make several amendments to existing law in one fell swoop. A check on such
multi-faceted, or comprehensive reform, is found in article 1I, section 8(d) of the
California Constitution, commonly referred to as the "single-subject rule."7 The
California Supreme Court has time and again recognized that "the single-subject
requirement should not be interpreted in an unduly narrow or restrictive fashion
that would preclude the use of the initiative process to accomplish comprehensive,
broad-based reform in a particular area of public concern."8 Despite this
longstanding policy, the California Supreme Court recently struck down an
initiative measure in Senate v. Jones prior to the March 2000 primary election
based on a single-subject rule challenge for the first time in the history of the
rule.9 This year, however, a comprehensive criminal justice initiative was upheld
in Manduley v. Superior Court.l° This article explores these two recent cases,suggests that Jones was not a major departure from prior single-subject case law,
2. Id.; see generally Manduley v. Superior Court, 27 Cal. 4th 537 (2002); Brosnahan v. Brown, 32 Cal.
3d 236 (1982) [hereinafter Brosnahan Ill.
3. 32 Cal. 3d 236.
4. 52 Cal. 3d 336.
5. Id. at 347-48; Brosnahan II, 32 Cal. 3d at 248.
6. David S. Broder, Dangerotts Initiatives: A Snake in the Grass Roots, WASH. POST, Mar. 26, 2000, at B I
(indicating that the industry of initiative passage now requires substantial cash for lawyers, consultants, and paid signature
gatherers and that the movement has become a tool of special interest groups, rather than a grass roots check on those with
political power).
7. CAL. CONST. art. II, § 8(d).
8. Senate v. Jones, 21 Cal. 4th 1142, 1157(1999).
9. 21 Cal. 4th at 1142.
10. 27 Cal. 4th at 537.
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and analyzes the standard that the California Supreme Court will likely apply to
future comprehensive criminal justice initiatives in particular.
II. HISTORY OF THE SINGLE-SUBJECT RULE AND THE
REASONABLY-GERMANE TEST
Article II, section 8(d) of the California Constitution was originally adopted
by the electorate in 1948, in an apparent response to a lengthy, multi-faceted
initiative proposed covering topics ranging from taxation to oleomargarine subsidies
that at that time had been the source of considerable controversy." The ballot
argument in favor of the proposed single-subject amendment explained that the
principal purpose of the amendment was to attempt to avoid confusion of both
voters and petition-signers and to prevent the subversion of the electorate's will. 2
Justice Mosk, in Brosnahan I, explained that the ballot argument in favor of the
single-subject rule "declared, somewhat optimistically, that an initiative confined
to 'one subject and one subject only' would enable voters to 'readily understand
just what the entire proposition is and not be confused or misled by a maze of
unrelated matters, some of which are inadequately explained, purposely distorted,
or intentionally concealed."' 3 This focus on eliminating voter confusion and ensuring
the integrity of the electorate's will has been given at least lip service in most
single-subject rule cases since the passage of the 1948 constitutional amendment.
However, the standard employed by the courts and the highly deferential
application of that standard in response to complex measures has not always protected
voters against confusing and coercive initiatives.
Courts have interpreted the single-subject rule for initiatives as requiring
application of a standard equivalent to the single-subject rule applied to other
legislative enactments. '4 This standard is referred to as the "reasonably-germane"
test. The test establishes that "an initiative measure does not violate the single-
subject requirement if, despite its varied collateral effects, all of its parts are
'reasonably germane' to each other, and to the general purpose or object of the
initiative."" Courts have also explained the test as requiring a common purpose
or objective that unifies the various provisions of an initiative measure." Further,
11. Amador Valley Joint Union High Sch. Dist. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 22 Cal. 3d 208, 229 (1978).
12. Jones, 21 Cal. 4th at 1156-57 (citing SECRETARY OF STATE, STATE OF CALIFORNIA, PROPOSED
AMENDMENTS TO CONSTITUTION, PROPOSITIONS AND PROPOSED LAWS, TOGETHER WITH ARGUMENTS 8-9
(1948)) [hereinafter PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO CONSTITUTtON].
13. Brosnahan v. Eu, 31 Cal. 3d 1, 7 (1982) (Mosk, J., concurring and dissenting) [hereinafter Brosnahan 1]
(quoting PROPOSED AMENDMENISTO CONStTIULION, supra note 12, at 8-9).
14. Manduley, 27 Cal. 4th at 586. See Daniel H. Lowenstein, California Initiatives and the Single-Subject Rule, 30
UCLA L. REV. 936, 970 (1983) (citing Perry, v. Jordan, 34 Cal. 2d 87 (1949)). At least one scholar has also linked the
emergence of a standard relating to the single-subject rule to the standard applied to cases involving constitutional revision.
Gerald F. Uelmen, Handling Hot Potatoes: Judicial Review of California Initiatives After Senate v. Jones, 41 SANTA
CLARA L. REV. 999, 1011-20 (2001).
15. Jones, 21 Cal. 4th at 1157 (quoting Legislature v. Eu, 54 Cal. 3d 492, 512 (1991)).
16. Brosnahan I1, 32 Cal. 3d at 247; Raven, 52 Cal. 3d at 347.
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a "functionally related" test, proposed initially by Justice Wiley Manuel in
Schmitz v. Younger,7 and later advocated by Justice Mosk in his dissent in
Brosnahan I," has been expressly rejected by the majority of the current
California Supreme Court as too stringent. 9 The court has recently expressly
stated that the single-subject rule for initiatives "does not require that each of the
provisions of a measure effectively interlock in a functional relationship .... [all
that is required is] that the various provisions are reasonably related to a common
theme or purpose."2° Through use of the reasonably-germane test, the California
Supreme Court has upheld every initiative measure presented to it on a single-
subject rule challenge, save one."
1l1. JUDICIAL REVIEW OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE INITIATIVES
PRE-SENATE V. JONES
While many subject areas have been addressed by initiatives in the nearly
century long history of initiative law-making in California, initiatives relating to
criminal justice matters have been on the rise recently. In the last twenty years,
four major criminal justice initiatives have been presented to the people
including: Proposition 8, the Victims' Bill of Rights in 1982; Proposition 115, the
Crime Victims' Justice Reform Act in 1990; Proposition 184, the Three Strikes
Initiative in 1994; and Proposition 21, the Gang Violence and Juvenile Crime
Prevention Act in 1998. Of these initiatives, three have been the subject of
2single-subject rule challenges decided by the California Supreme Court.
California courts have never struck down a criminal justice initiative for
violation of the single-subject rule. In fact, prior to Jones, the California Supreme
Court had not struck down an initiative of any kind based on a single-subject rule
violation.21 Successful single-subject rule challenges were limited to two decisions by
the Third District Court of Appeal addressing initiatives covering "insurance costs"
and "public disclosure." 24 In those cases, the court of appeals found the dual
17. 21 Cal. 3d 90, 97 (1978).
18. 31Cal. 3dat9.
19. Lowenstein, supra note 14, at 937.
20. Jones, 21 Cal. 4th at 1157.
21. Id.
22. Brosnahan I, 31 Cal. 3d I (Proposition 8); Brosnahan 11, 32 Cal. 3d 236 (Proposition 8); Raven, 52
Cal. 3d 336 (Proposition 115); Manduley, 27 Cal. 4th at 537 (Proposition 21). The Three Strikes initiative was
also the subject of California Supreme Court review on constitutional grounds but not on a single-subject
challenge. For a detailed history of the Three Strikes legislative and initiative history and the ensuing court
challenge see Michael Vitiello, "Three Strikes" and the Romero Case: The Supreme Court Restores
Democracy, 30 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1601 (1997).
23. In the landmark case Perry v. Jordan, 34 Cal. 2d 87 (1949), the California Supreme Court did strike
down a referendum based on a single-subject rule challenge, and in that case it set forth the single-subject
standard that is still used today in assessing the validity of measures under article 11, section 8(d) of the
California Constitution.
24. California Trial Lawyers Ass'n v. Eu, 200 Cal. App. 3d 351 (3d Dist. 1988) (invalidating the
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objectives of the single-subject rule-namely avoidance of voter confusion and
elimination of logrolling-frustrated.25 Despite similar claims of voter confusion
and logrolling, the two major criminal justice initiatives that were reviewed by
the California Supreme Court prior to Jones, passed single-subject rule muster,
although not without vociferous dissent and debate."
A. Brosnahan v. Eu and Brosnahan v. Brown
Proposition 8, the Victims' Bill of Rights, was the subject of both a pre-election
and a post-election challenge.27 The decisions of the court and the dissenting
voices in the Brosnahan cases, with respect both to pre-election review and
substantive analysis of initiatives challenged under the single-subject rule,
crystallized much of the jurisprudence surrounding future challenges under the
single-subject rule. The initiative at issue contained changes to the California
Constitution, as well as the California Penal and Welfare and Institutions Codes,
relating to a vast array of criminal justice related topics including among other
things: restitution, safe schools, relevance of evidence, bail, prior convictions,
diminished capacity and insanity defenses, habitual criminals, victim's statements, plea
bargaining, sentencing to youth authority, and mentally disordered sex offenders." In
other words, it offered something for everyone.29
The majority of the court determined that pre-election review was improper.0
Specifically, the court noted that "it is usually more appropriate to review
constitutional and other challenges to ballot propositions or initiative measures
after an election rather than to disrupt the electoral process by preventing the
exercise of the people's franchise, in the absence of some clear showing of
invalidity."'" As a result of this assessment of the propriety of pre-election review, the
majority did not reach the substantive question of the single-subject constitutionality
of Proposition 8 until Brosnahan II. Both the concurring opinion of Justice
Insurance Cost Control Initiative of 1988 before the November 1988 election); Chem. Specialties Mfr.'s Ass'n
v. Deukmejian, 227 Cal. App. 3d 663 (1991) (invalidating the Public's Right to Know Act after the November
1988 election).
25. California Trial Lawyers, 200 Cal. App. 3d at 351, 360-61 (finding that a campaign contribution
provision placed inconspicuously in the middle of a ballot measure was not reasonably germane to the rest of
the provisions of the initiative and would lead to voter confusion); Chem. Specialties, 227 Cal. App. 3d at 671-
72 (finding that "public disclosure" was a subject of excessive generality and that there was evidence of
logrolling in order to secure passage of the measure).
26. Brosnahan 11, 32 Cal. 3d at 236; Raven, 52 Cal. 3d at 336.
27. Brosnahan I, 31 Cal. 3d at I (pre-election challenge); Brosnahan II, 32 Cal. 3d at 236 (post-election
challenge).
28. Brosnahan II, 32 Cal. 3d at 242-45.
29. Opponents of the measure challenged the measure prior to the election on procedural and constitutional
grounds. Brosnahan 1, 31 Cal. 3d at 2. The Legislature stepped in with an urgency statute to ensure that the procedural
challenge was without merit. Id. at 4.
30. Id.
31. Id.
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Broussard and the concurring and dissenting opinion of Justice Mosk in Brosnahan I
took issue with this premise, finding instead that the plain language of article II,
section 8(d) of the California Constitution contemplated pre-election review of
single-subject rule challenges."
Justice Mosk went on in Brosnahan I to analyze Proposition 8 under both the
reasonably-germane and functionally-related tests:" His concurring and dissenting
opinion concluded that sections as disparate as (1) money restitution, (2)
abolition of a program for treatment of mentally ill sex offenders, (3) declaration
of a right to be safe in school, and (4) removal of the defense of diminished
capacity, had no "natural connection" to one another and could not be viewed as
constituting a single scheme." Justice Mosk found other flaws with the measure
such as the potential for voter confusion and deception relating to the contents of
the title and summary when juxtaposed with the contents of the substance of the
measure." Specifically, he pointed to the Attorney General's identification of
twelve subjects contained in the initiative and the fact that, though the petition
indicated that the initiative encompassed a right for students and staff to be safe
in schools, no specific right was mandated by the actual changes made by the
initiative. 3' Despite Justice Mosk's compelling analysis, when the Proposition 8
post-election challenge was heard, his colleagues did not agree."
In the post-election challenge, the majority of the court focused on the liberal
construction of the single-subject rule and concluded that Proposition 8 met the
reasonably-germane test by unifying its provisions around a common object of
"promoting the rights of actual and potential crime victims.,3 The Brosnahan II
majority quoted language from FPPC v. Superior Court, 9 in which the court
indicated that "[n]umerous provisions, having one general object, if fairly
indicated in the title, may be united in one act."4 Further referencing FPPC, the
Brosnahan II court indicated that "[i]n keeping with the policy favoring the
initiative, the voters may not be limited to brief general statements but may deal
comprehensively and in detail with an area of law.' 4 The majority opinion made
plain that the functionally-related test, which had been referenced in prior
32. Id. (Broussard, J., concurring); see also id. at 6 (Mosk, J., concurring and dissenting) (stressing that,
where the electorate does not have the power to adopt the proposal in the first instance, the measure should be
excluded from the ballot). Justice Mosk's analysis on pre-election review was later followed by American
Federation of Labor-Congress of Industrial Organizations v. Eu, 36 Cal. 3d 687, 695-96 (1984) and eventually by
Senate v. Jones, 21 Cal. 4th 1142 (1999).
33. Brosnahan 1, 31 Cal. 3d at 8-9 (Mosk, J., concurring and dissenting).
34. Id. at 11.
35. Id. at 11-12.
36. Id.
37. Brosnahan I1, 32 Cal. 3d at 236.
38. Id. at 247.
39. Fair Political Practices Comm'n v. Super. Ct., 25 Cal. 3d 33, 38 (1979).
40. Brosnahan II, 32 Cal. 3d at 246, 248 (emphasis added).
41. Id. at 246 (quoting Fair Political Practices Con 'n, 25 Cal. 3d at 41).
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California Supreme Court decisions was not a constitutional prerequisite to
42single-subject compliance. The central theme of the opinion was focused on the
importance of comprehensive reform and the ability of the electorate to propose
and pass integrated reform.43 Professor Lowenstein, one of the few scholars
writing on the issue of initiative law in the early 1980s, endorsed the reasonably-
germane test in an article published shortly after the Brosnahan H decision; he
also stressed that "initiatives dealing comprehensively with broad problems must
be permitted."44 While Professor Lowenstein did propose a "gloss" to the test,
requiring courts to examine the public understanding of the provisions as related
to one another, he was very supportive of a deferential standard that the courts had
historically employed and were continuing to employ in the Brosnahan cases.45
The call for deference and liberal construction of the single-subject rule by
the majority of the court in the mid-1980s, as well as by a well-respected legal
academic, relegated the petitioners' arguments of logrolling and voter confusion
to ineffective pleas that were summarily dismissed without analysis of materials
outside of the measure itself. For example, although the petitioners argued that
the vast array of provisions joined in Proposition 8 enhanced the danger of
logrolling, the court dismissed this risk as inherent in all legislation whether
enacted by initiative or the legislature. 46 Similarly, discourse concerning the
possibility of voter confusion was rebuffed with a statement that voters received
the text and ballot pamphlet arguments and an observation that some amount of
voter confusion "must be borne" if the initiative process is to be preserved.47 The
court made abundantly clear that if any presumption or assumption was to apply
to review of initiative measures, it should be that the electorate duly considered
all provisions of a measure and that the people "knew exactly what they were
doing" when passing comprehensive reforms. 4" On this basis, the majority
concluded that Proposition 8's variety of reforms shared a common purpose and
met the "liberal interpretative tradition" employed historically in single-subject
rule challenges.49
The dissenting opinions of Chief Justice Bird and Justice Mosk, joined by
Justice Broussard, were not complimentary of the majority's analysis or conclusion (to
put it mildly). Chief Justice Bird commenced her thorough analysis of Proposition 8
by stating, "Today, a bare majority of this court obliterates one section of the
42. Id. at 248-49.
43. Id. at 249-51. It should be noted that the California Supreme Court was under political pressure and
arguably partisan attack at the time of the Brosnahan 11 decision. Four justices were facing retention election in
November 1982, and Senate candidate Pete Wilson had announced that he would campaign against anyone who
voted to invalidate Proposition 8. Uelmen, supra note 14, at 100 1-02.
44. Lowenstein, supra note 14, at 965.
45. Id. at 970.
46. Brosnahan H, 32 Cal. 3d at 250-51.
47. Id. at 252.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 253.
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state Constitution by effectively repealing the single subject rule."5 ° Justice Mosk
similarly pronounced:
A bare majority of this court have rejected fundamentals of constitutional
law that have consistently guided this state in the conduct of its affairs. In
lieu of those basic principles, four justices now declare that initiative
promoters may obtain signatures for any proposal, however radical in
concept and effect, and if they can persuade [fifty-one] percent of those
who vote at an ensuing election to say "aye," the measure becomes law
regardless of how patently it may offend constitutional limitations.5 '
The tenor and substance of the debate between the majority and the dissenting
Justices concerning the proper interpretation and construction to give the single-
subject rule in Brosnahan II is still reflected in the California Supreme Court's
single-subject jurisprudence. Although, in my opinion, to date Justice Mosk's
closing sentiment in his Brosnahan II dissent has not been matched in dramatic
appeal. After decrying the loss of article II, section 8(d) of the California Constitution,
Justice Mosk concluded that "[t]he Goddess of Justice is wearing a black arm-
band today, as she weeps for the Constitution of California."52
B. Raven v. Deukmejian
By 1990, when Proposition 115 was challenged, the makeup of the court had
changed, but the employment of the reasonably-germane test and the liberal
construction of the single-subject rule in cases involving comprehensive criminal
justice measures had not.53 In fact, in the six-to-one decision, the court
demonstrated the strength of Brosnahan H and its continued willingness to accept
multifarious initiatives centered around the People's intent to take the power of
criminal justice decision-making out of the hands of the court and the Legislature. 
4
The court, in Raven, examined Proposition 115 under both the single-subject
requirement and the prohibition against constitutional revision.55 Proposition 115
passed the single-subject challenge under the reasonably-germane test, but one
provision of the initiative fell at the hands of the constitutional revision rule.56
50. Id. at 262 (Bird, C.J., dissenting).
51. Id. at 297-98 (Mosk, J., dissenting).
52. Brosnahan I, 32 Cal. 3d at 299.
53. Raven, 52 Cal. 3d at 346-47.
54. Id. at 347-48 (quoting Brosnahan II for the proposition that "in the absence of some compelling,
overriding constitutional imperative, we should not prohibit the sovereign people from either expressing or
implementing their own will on matters of such direct and immediate importance to them as their own
perceived safety.").
55. Id. at 340, 346-50 (explaining that electors may not effectuate a constitutional revision, as opposed
to a constitutional amendment by initiative, and explaining the difference between an amendment and a revision
by both quantitative and qualitative standards).
56. Id.
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The court determined that the provision limiting a criminal defendant's rights to
those afforded by the United States Constitution was a qualitative change to the
California constitution which amounted to a revision." As to the single-subject
challenge, even Justice Broussard who had joined in Justice Mosk's Brosnahan H
dissent joined the majority opinion finding Brosnahan II controlling and
identifying the single-subject of "promotion of the rights of actual and potential
crime victims.
58
In Raven, the court identified the major changes to existing law as encompassing
procedural restrictions on the rights of criminal defendants at the discovery,
preliminary examination, and trial stages of litigation, as well as substantive
changes in criminal law in the form of adding of new offenses and provision for
more severe punishment for other offenses.5 9 The court also observed that, as in
Proposition 8, many of the initiative changes were directed toward superseding
California Supreme Court holdings, which expanded the rights of criminal
defendants.0 Although the court stressed that a theme of abrogating court
decisions alone would not be enough to satisfy the single-subject standard, the
court's reliance on this common thread in both Brosnahan H and Raven suggests
that the court may be particularly wary to strike down an initiative that appears
rooted in public dissatisfaction with court opinions.6'
The Raven petitioners, like those in Brosnahan H, raised concerns of
logrolling and voter confusion based on the breadth and complexity of the measure.62
63The court in Raven, like the court in Brosnahan H, rejected those arguments.
The logrolling argument was dismissed with a reference to the inherent risk of
combining minority constituencies or inclusion of riders in all legislation. 4 The
court further reiterated its rejection of a standard requiring a "functional
interrelationship or interdependence" between provisions or a showing that each
provision of the measure could have garnered a majority vote on its own. 65 With
respect to assertions of voter confusion, the court once again pointed to Brosnahan H
and summarily dismissed the arguments indicating that the voters' pamphlet-a
detailed analysis by the Legislative Analyst, a complete text of the measure, and
"customary written arguments and rebuttals"-were enough to establish that the
voters understood the initiative. 66
57. Id. Professor Uelmen points to this "omnibus repealer" clause as a classic example of a provision
that was drafted with no deliberation safeguards and one about which the public would likely have been in the
dark concerning its impact on the constitution. Uelmen, supra note 14, at 1017.
58. Raven, 52 Cal. 3d at 347.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 348.
62. Id. at 348-49.
63. Id.
64. Raven, 52 Cal. 3d at 348.
65. Id. at 349.
66. Id. The court also noted that "Proposition 115 was the subject of intense public focus ... prior to the
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Justice Mosk, in perhatis his most thorough review of the history and purpose
of the single-subject rule and jurisprudence surrounding it, dissented.67 In
addition to stressing that Brosnahan II expressly did not require giving "carte
blanche to initiatives promoters to join together numerous disparate topics into
one 'grabbag' proposal," Justice Mosk urged that the reasonably-germane
standard, at a minimum, should require some reasonable relationship between the
provisions of an initiative and indicated that acceptance of a standard that requires
only that the provisions fall under some "label of indefinite scope is simply
empty. '" ' Justice Mosk found the subject identified by the majority in both
Brosnahan II and Raven ("promotion of the rights of actual and potential crime
victims") to be nothing more than a label of indefinite scope.69 Therefore, he
concluded that the provisions of Proposition 115, like those contained in
Proposition 8, were insufficient to demonstrate a single coherent enactment for
the purposes of the single-subject rule.70 Significantly, Justice Mosk's analysis of
proper application of the reasonably-germane test focused on two bases that later
informed the court's application of the reasonably-germane test in Jones: (1) the
reasoning and outcome of California Trial Lawyers Association v. Eu,71 which
determined that although all provisions could fall under a general label of
insurance reforms, such a broad label was insufficient for single-subject purposes, and
(2) Professor Lowenstein's interpretation of the purpose of the single-subject rule
as an outlet for public dissatisfaction which may serve to reform broad policy
areas but which does not contemplate "changes across the board.
' 72
IV. ADDING TEETH TO THE SINGLE-SUBJECT RULE?
SENATE V. JONES
"Act in haste, repent at leisure. This court may well regret its precipitous
decision in this case, and the unfortunate precedent it sets."" These ominous
words written by Justice Kennard in her dissenting opinion represent the tone and
tenor of many court opinions relating to the initiative process in general and
single-subject rule challenges in particular. From Justice Kennard's strong admonition,
one would think that Senate v. Jones was a major departure from prior single-
election." Id. However, it parenthetically noted that the portion of the initiative on which the attention was
centered related to the measure's impact on abortion rights. Id. Arguably, focus on such an attenuated provision
would have misled voters further concerning the various impacts and effects that the initiative would have on
the criminal justice system as a whole. The court did not address how intense public focus on only one
tenuously related provision aids public understanding of the measure.
67. id. at 356-66 (Mosk, J., dissenting).
68. Id. at 356-57, 360.
69. Raven, 52 Cal. 3d at 365.
70. Id. at 364-65.
71. 200 Cal. App. 3d at 35 1.
72. Raven, 52 Cal. 3d at 361-63 (Mosk, J., dissenting).
73. Jones, 21 Cal. 4th at 1176 (Kennard, J., dissenting).
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subject rule jurisprudence. But, was it? Jones tackled two main issues: (1) the
propriety of pre-election review for single-subject rule challenges, and (2) the
merits of a single-subject rule challenge to an initiative that purported to have as
a theme "voter control" or possibly "conditions of [legislative] employment."
7 4
Jones was decided before the March 2000 primary election and resulted in
the removal of Proposition 24, the "Let the Voter's Decide Act of 2000," from
the March ballot based on its failure to satisfy the single-subject rule of article II,
section 8(d) of the California Constitution.75 The majority in Jones found that
Proposition 24 embraced "at least two separate and unrelated subjects: (1)
transfer of the power to reapportion state legislative, congressional, and Board of
Equalization districts from the Legislature to the California Supreme Court, and
(2) revision of provisions relating to the compensation of state legislators and
other state officers."76 Importantly, the proponents of Proposition 24 circulated
four other initiative proposals concurrently with what became Proposition 24, all
containing the provisions relating to reapportionment.77 One proponent was
quoted in the newspaper as acknowledging that the provisions in the initiative
relating to reduction in legislative compensation were included to garner votes.78
Against this backdrop, the Jones court did not expressly introduce a new standard
for single-subject review of initiatives, but its willingness to examine a measure
based on a single-subject rule challenge prior to the election and its inaugural
disqualification of an initiative based on this constitutional requirement, prompted the
heated words of the dissenting justices and sent waves through the initiative
industry and academic circles. In fact, the court specifically responded to past
academic criticism by indicating that recent Court of Appeals decisions, and
presumably Jones itself, "demonstrate that the rule is neither devoid of content
nor as 'toothless' as some legal commentaries have suggested., 79 As stated above,
the unique features of this case were its posture as a pre-election challenge and its
outcome on the merits. I discuss each in turn.
A. Pre-Election Review
Pre-election review of initiative measures has never been a favored practice.
8
0
The California Supreme Court has repeatedly cautioned that reviewing a measure
prior to the election may "disrupt the electoral process by preventing the exercise
of the people's franchise."81 Relying on the language of article II, section 8(d) of
74. Id. at 1174.
75. Id. at 1152.
76. Id. at 1146.
77. Id. at 1149 n.2.
78. Jones, 21 Cal. 4th at 1151 n.5.
79. Id. at 1158.
80. Legislature v. Deukmejian, 34 Cal. 3d 658, 665-66 (1983).
81. Jones, 21 Cal. 4th at 1153 (quoting Brosnahan /, 31 Cal. 3d at 1,4).
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the California Constitution itself, the Jones majority nonetheless found that in
certain single-subject rule challenges "pre[-]election relief not only is permissible
but is expressly contemplated. 8 2 While referencing its discussion of pre-election
review in Brosnahan I, and acknowledging that in that case contemplation was
made of pre-election review only upon a "clear showing of invalidity," the Jones
court concluded that pre-election review of a single-subject rule violation was
proper where there exists a "strong likelihood" of a violation.
The rationale for the court's shift in standard for pre-election review seems to
be directly related to practical concerns and increasing public criticism of the
initiative process. The Jones majority opinion referenced "increasing cynicism on
the part of the electorate with respect to the efficacy of the initiative process," the
deflection of "attention, time and money" from valid propositions, and voter confusion
and frustration at the post-election invalidation of a measure as reasons for
entertaining a single-subject challenge pre-election. The court's willingness to
base its reasoning on such considerations indicates a return to the original
intention of the single-subject constitutional amendment-namely avoidance of• 85
voter confusion.
Justice Kennard's dissenting opinion in Jones highlighted the majority's
departure from its historic pre-election review stance.86 The dissent argued that
aside from Perry v. Jordan,7 in which a measure was likely to be withheld from
the ballot based on a trial court determination of a single-subject rule violation,
no single-subject case before Jones had been decided on pre-election review, and
many had been decided based on post-election review." Justice Kennard asserted
that, because single-subject challenges require a detailed examination of the substance
of an initiative, they should be postponed until after an election when the courts
may have more time for deliberation and careful analysis. 89
Pre-election review has been pointed to as a potentially powerful reform to
the increasingly overwhelming and frustrating California initiative process.90
Professor Uelmen advocates for pre-election review in cases of both single-
subject and constitutional revision violations and urges a singular merits review
pre-election, rather than the imposition of the fiction of a "strong likelihood"
82. Id.
83. Id. at 1154 (citing Brosnahan I, 31 Cal. 3d at 4 and indicating that the subsequent failed post-
election challenge on single-subject rule grounds indicated no clear showing or strong likelihood of invalidity).
Professor Uelmen finds the court's attempt to distinguish Jones from Brosnahan I on this point to be unavailing,
and I agree. Uelmen, supra note 14, at 1005-06.
84. Id.
85. PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO CONSTITUTION, supra note 12, at 8-9.
86. Jones, 21 Cal. 4th at 1170-72 (Kennard, J., dissenting).
87. 34 Cal. 2d 87 (1949).
88. Jones, 21 Cal. 4th at 1172 (Kennard, J., dissenting).
89. Id. at 1171, 1172.
90. See THE SPEAKER'S COMMISSION ON THE CALIFORNIA INITIATIVE PROCESS, FINAL REPORT 19
(Mar. 4, 2002) [hereinafter FINAL REPORT] (advocating pre-election review for single-subject rule violations by
the Attorney General's office prior to release of title and summary for initiative circulation).
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standard for pre-election challenges. 9' His article asserts that single-subject rule
challenges and challenges based on a violation of the prohibition against constitutional
revision can be litigated with little evidence, and the benefits to the electorate of
having invalid measures stricken from the ballot is great. 92 Whether the court's
willingness to review Jones pre-election and the reforms being called for by most
who study the initiative process, will result in a significant departure from the
status quo remains to be seen, but, for the moment the direction of both the court
and those seeking to reform the initiative process incrementally seems to be
synchronized around the pre-election review issue.
B. Merits of the Single-Subject Rule Challenge
In Jones, the majority of the California Supreme Court approvingly acknowledged
a suggestion by the petitioners that the initiative measure be "viewed from a realistic
and commonsense perspective" to determine whether the provisions of a measure
embrace one subject or more.93 Aside from this small clarification, the court did
not expressly depart from its reasonably-germane test.9'4 In fact, the court stated
that it used the same standard in deciding Jones as it used in upholding prior
initiative single-subject challenges, 95 including those in Brosnahan II, Fair
Political Practices Commission v. Superior Court,96 and Legislature v. Eu.97 In
language respectful of the initiative process, the court "[emphasized] that proper
application and enforcement of the single-subject rule is by no means inconsistent
with the cherished and favored role that the initiative process occupies in our
constitutional scheme, but on the contrary constitutes an integral safeguard against
improper manipulation or abuse of that process."98 So, while departing from the
outcome of passed initiative challenges, the Jones court was careful to avoid
questioning prior single-subject rule decisions and made an effort to characterize
the decision in terms of strengthening the initiative process, rather than limiting
the power of the electorate. 99
Significantly, however, in analyzing the single-subject rule challenge in
Jones, the court drew analogies to the two court of appeals decisions which
struck down initiatives based on single-subject rule challenges, rather than basing
its conclusion solely on distinctions between Jones and prior high court decisions.O0
91. Uelmen, supra note 14, at 1020-2 1.
92. Id. at 1022-25.
93. 21 Cal. 4th at 1161.
94. Id. at 1157; Uelmen, supra note 14, at 1007.
95. Jones, 21 Cal. 4th at 1157.
96. 25 Cal. 3d 33 (1979).
97. 54 Cal. 3d 492 (1991).
98. Jones, 21 Cal. 4th at 1158.
99. Id.
100. Id. (citing to California Trial Lawyers Ass'n, 200 Cal. App. 3d 351 and Chemical Specialties
Manufacturer's Ass'n, 227 Cal. App. 3d 663).
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As Professor Uelmen notes, in the portions of the opinion which attempt to distinguish
Jones from prior unsuccessful single-subject rule challenges, the reasoning employed
is not analytically inspiring.'0° For example, the single-subject identified by the
proponents of Proposition 24 in Jones was "voter approval."' 0 The court determined
that the provisions requiring voter approval of both changes in legislative salaries and
redistricting efforts were not reasonably related to a common theme or purpose, but it
found that prior single-subject decisions such as Fair Political Practices Commission
(FPPC)°3 and Legislature v. Eu'°4 did manifest sufficiently singular themes of
"reforming political campaign practices" and "incumbency reform," respectively.0°
Justice Kennard, in her dissenting opinion, challenged both the definition of the
theme and the distinction between the breadth of prior themes and the theme that
she recognized for Proposition 24. '6 In attempting to distinguish FPPC, the
majority stressed that "[u]nlike Proposition 24, the measure challenged in FPPC
did not seek to combine one major structural change in the state constitutional
framework[...] with unrelated measures[... ], but instead embodied a comprehensive
package of provisions that were reasonably related to a common theme of
reforming political campaign practices."'0 7 This reasoning comes close to suggesting
that the proponents of Proposition 24 erred by trying to unite only two provisions.
Perhaps if those seeking to reform the reapportionment process and involve
voters to a greater extent in the structural conditions of legislative branch
employment had incorporated more provisions demonstrating this mission, a
common theme or purpose could have been discerned. The propositions upheld
in FPPC and Legislature v. Eu were broad, sweeping comprehensive reforms,
similar in scope and complexity to the comprehensive criminal justice initiatives
challenged in Brosnahan II and Raven. '°8 Based on the analysis of prior case law
and the court's repeated mantra that the single-subject requirement does not
preclude "comprehensive, broad-based reform in a particular area of public
concern," one could construe Jones as more supportive of upholding complex
multi-faceted initiative measures than those that seek to approach an area of
public concern with a scalpel instead of a sledge hammer.' °9 Such an analysis
would fly in the face, however, of the fundamental purposes behind the single-
subject rule: "to avoid confusion of either voters or petition signers and to prevent
the subversion of the electorate's will.""0
101. Uelmen, supra note 14, at 1008.
102. Jones, 21 Cal. 4th at 1162.
103. 25 Cal. 3d at 33.
104. 54 Cal. 3d at 492.
105. Jones, 21 Cal. 4th at 1167.
106. Id. at 1174-76.
107. Id. at 1167.
108. 25 Cal. 3d at 33; 54 Cal. 3d at 492.
109. Jones, 21 Cal. 4th at 1157, 1166-68.
110. Id. at 1156.
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It is ultimately around these themes that the Jones majority based its decision
and analogized Chemical Specialties Manufacturer's Association v. Deukmejian and
California Trial Lawyers Association."' The court concluded that "voter approval"
was an excessively broad theme, similar to the theme of "public disclosure" in
Chemical Specialties that, if accepted, would undermine the single-subject rule."'
Specifically, the court held that
[w]hen the drafters of an initiative measure join separate provisions
dealing with otherwise unrelated "political issues" in a single initiative,
the initiative cannot be found to satisfy the single-subject rule simply
because each provision imposes a requirement of voter approval, any
more than if each provision contained a remedy of money damages or a
remedy of injunctive relief."3
The proponent's effort to establish a narrower theme was unsuccessful in
Jones because the theme "legislative self-interest" was not bom out by the provisions
impacted by the initiative."' Without directly identifying the similarities between
Proposition 24 and the initiative at issue in California Trial Lawyers Association,
the court concluded that the concerns expressed in that case-namely voter
confusion and deception-were also present in Proposition 24."5
Professor Uelmen suggests in his recent article on Jones that the court focused its
inquiry concerning the single subject of Proposition 24 indirectly on a "public
understanding" test, in the nature of the one advanced two decades ago by
Professor Lowenstein and considered in a modified form by the California
Commission on Campaign Financing in 1992."' Professor Lowenstein's test is a
"gloss" on the reasonably-germane test that requires the court to inquire outside
of the text of the initiative and ask whether "in the public understanding" the
provisions of the initiative "bear some relationship to each other."" 7 Under
Lowenstein's test, which is intended to compliment the reasonably-germane test
that he advocates, even Jones would have passed constitutional muster in that it
is conceivable that the two provisions bear some relationship to one another." 8
11. id. at 1158-66.
112. Id. at 1162.
113. Id. at 1162-63.
114. Id. at 1163-64 (indicating that since legislative salaries were set by the California Citizens
Compensation Commission, the legislative salary provisions of Proposition 24 could not be found to be related
to a theme of eliminating legislative self-interest).
115. Jones, 21 Cal. 4th at 1168 (finding that "to combine a provision transferring the power of reapportionment
from the Legislature to this court with unrelated provisions relating to legislators' pay would inevitably create
voter confusion and obscure the electorate's intent with regard to each of the separate subjects included within
the initiative, undermining the basic objectives sought to be achieved by the single-subject rule").
116. Uelmen, supra note 14, at 1009-11.
117. Lowenstein, supra note 14, at 970.
118. Daniel H. Lowenstein, Initiatives and the New Single Subject Rule, I ELECTION L.J. 35, 39-41
(2002).
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The California Commission on Campaign Financing rejected the public understanding
test in its 1992 recommendations, but suggested a more objective "reasonable voter"
factor to be examined when determining whether an initiative embraces more
than one subject." 9 Under this test, a court would assess whether a voter would be. .. 120
surprised to learn that a provision was included in the initiative. While I agree
that the propositions involved in FPPC, Legislature v. Eu, and Brosnahan II, would
have satisfied the standard of Professor Lowenstein's "public understanding" test more
readily than Proposition 24, 1 am not convinced that a more objective "reasonable
voter" standard would have distinguished between the subjects of Proposition 24
and the multi-faceted initiatives at issue in prior cases. In fact, the more
provisions incorporated into an initiative, the more likely that a voter would not
have specific knowledge of each and every component of the changes proposed.
Moreover, I think that the deviation of outcome in Jones may have been based on
a much simpler premise. Invalidation of Jones was made easy for the court
because of the presence of clear evidence of logrolling and attempts at voter
confusion, in the form of multiple versions of the initiative and a published
admission by a proponent that the legislative salary section was a provision




In the end, Jones laid the groundwork for single-subject review pre-election,
and signaled to initiative proponents that the single-subject rule would be enforced
where evidence of voter confusion or logrolling was present. The question was, at best,
left open as to whether a modification of the old reasonably-germane standard to
include a "public understanding gloss" or some other requirement to look outside
the language of the initiative and ballot materials would make its way into the
single-subject jurisprudence.
V. THE FIRST POST-JONES CHALLENGE: MANDULEY
V. SUPERIOR COURT
Manduley 2 represents the first single-subject rule challenge entertained by
the California Supreme Court since Jones.'23 While some scholars, and no doubt
petitioners' counsel, anticipated a more stringent examination, if not standard, for
119. CALIFORNIA COMMISSION ON CAMPAIGN FINANCING, CENTER FOR RESPONSIVE GOVERNMENT,
DEMOCRACY BY INITIATIVE: SHAPING CALIFORNIA'S FOURTH BRANCH OF GOVERNMENT 319 (1992).
120. Id.
121. Jones, 21 Cal. 4th at 1151 n.5.
122. 27 Cal. 4th 537 (2002).
123. Procedurally, Mandulev came to the California Supreme Court as the result of a challenge brought
by juveniles who were charged as adults, and not entitled to a fitness hearing in juvenile court under the new
law. By way of demurrers, the defendants raised several constitutional arguments in response to their
prosecution. After the superior court overruled the defendants' demurrers, the court of appeals reversed finding
that portions of the new law violated the separation of powers doctrine by permitting the prosecutor discretion
in choosing between two legislatively authorized schemes. Id. at 547. Because the court of appeals found a
separation of powers violation, it did not reach the merits of the petitioners' single-subject rule challenge. Id.
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the single-subject rule challenge in Manduley, a modified standard did not
emerge.' 24 Despite the ominous warning from Justice Kennard about the precedent
being set by the Jones decision,'25 the Manduley court reaffirmed its standard
deferential approach to initiatives and its "liberal construction" of the single-
subject rule.'26
In commencing its analysis of the single-subject challenge to the Gang
Violence and Juvenile Crime Prevention Act of 1998, the court, in Manduley,
first identified major sections of the initiative measure. 7 The court found that
one major section of the initiative was devoted to findings and declarations.
28
Three other groupings of sections were then identified by the court: (1) sections
three through thirteen, relating to criminal gang activity; (2) sections fourteen
through seventeen, amending the Three Strikes law by altering the list of "violent
felonies" and "serious felonies" in sections 667.5(c) and 1192.7(c) of the Penal
Code, and by changing the "lock-in" dates for certain offenses; and (3) sections
eighteen through thirty-four, amending the Welfare and Institutions Code concerning
the juvenile justice system, including revisions to confidentiality of juvenile
records, pre-hearing release of minors, and procedures and evidence rules in
wardship hearings. 29 While petitioners argued that these divergent groupings
might be related to a general goal of "reducing crime," they further asserted that
such an objective was "too broad to satisfy the requirements of the single-subject
rule." 30 The court rejected petitioners' characterization of the theme and purpose
of the initiative and identified instead the subject of the initiative as "[a]ddressing
the problem of juvenile crime and gang-related crime."'' 3' This, the court stated,
was a common purpose that united the various initiative provisions."' Relying on
a Department of Justice report, the court concluded that, because gang activity
frequently was engaged in by juveniles, the Proposition 21 changes to laws
involving gang-related crimes and to the juvenile justice system more generally
were reasonably germane to one another and to the common purpose of the
initiative measure.133
With respect to the final grouping of changes made by Proposition 21, the
majority unabashedly determined that alterations to the Three Strikes law also
124. Uelmen, supra note 14, at 1009 (suggesting that the court, without substantially altering the
reasonably-germane standard, added an element of public understanding to the test in Jones).
125. 21 Cal. 4th at 1176 (Kennard, J., dissenting).
126. 27 Cal. 4th at 575.
127. Id. at 574.
128. Id.
129. Id. at 574-75.
130. Id at 575.
131. Id. at 576. It should be noted that, in two places in the majority opinion, the court characterizes the
common purpose addressing "violent" crime committed by juveniles and gangs, but in its most definitive
statement of the common purpose of Proposition 2 1, the term "violent" is omitted. Id. at 575-76.
132. Manduley, 27 Cal. 4th at 576.
133. Id.
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"[bore] a reasonable and commonsense relationship to the initiative's provisions
regarding juvenile and gang-related crime."' 4 Faced with changes to the laws that
made new offenses such as rape, sodomy, oral copulation, burglary, assault with
a deadly weapon against a public transit employee, and use of a firearm in connection
with a felony, strikes against any offender, regardless of age, the court
nonetheless maintained that these changes were reasonably germane to the
subject of juvenile and gang-related crime.'35 By using an interesting grammatical
tactic-the double negative-the California Supreme Court loosened the reasonably-
germane standard slightly. It stated, "[W]e cannot properly conclude that they
[the Three Strikes qualifying offense alterations] are not reasonably related to the
goal of the initiative."'36 This sentence construction seems to suggest a
presumption of relation, rather than placing the burden on proponents to
demonstrate that the reasonably-germane test is met. In other words, the standard
used to read that an initiative measure would satisfy the single-subject
requirement "if, despite its varied collateral effects, all of its parts are
'reasonably germane' to each other, and to the general purpose or object of the
initiative."'37 A fair interpretation of the standard articulated in Manduley might
be that a measure will pass the single-subject requirement if the relationship
between the provisions is uncertain such that a court cannot definitively say that
the various provisions are not reasonably related. This peculiarly places the
burden on the court or the opponents to find a lack of relation, rather than placing
the burden on the proponents to prove that the sections are reasonably germane to
one another and to the subject of the initiative.
While the majority in Manduley engaged in a detailed analysis of how some
of the "violent" and "serious" felonies were linked to gang activity and juvenile
crime, the court concluded that even as to felonies committed more frequently by
adults, "a reasonable and commonsense relationship to the purpose of the initiative"
could be ascertained.38 Relying in part on the collateral effects language of the
reasonably-germane test, and in part on the existence of a functional relationship" 9
between increasing the list of serious and violent felonies and increasing the
number of juveniles who are ineligible to be adjudicated in juvenile court, the
majority determined that the Three Strikes amendments were reasonably related
134. Id. at 577.
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. Id. at 575.
138. Manduley, 27 Cal. 4th at 578.
139. Although clearly rejecting the functional relationship test advocated by Justice Manuel and later
Justice Mosk, the Manduley majority applied a component of the functional-relationship test when attempting to
justify the inclusion of the arguably non-germane provisions of Proposition 21. Id. at 575. "As we recently have
explained, 'the single subject provision does not require that each of the provisions of a measure effectively
interlock in a functional relationship."' Id. at 579. "Thus, the list of violent and serious felonies contained in the
Three Strikes law bears both a topical and a functional relationship to provisions regarding juvenile crime." Id.
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to the other provisions of Proposition 21."' Signaling a reaffirmation of some of
its pre-Jones single-subject rule cases, the majority also recognized that the
criminal justice initiatives upheld in Brosnahan H and Raven were based on
subjects far broader than the subject approved of in Manduley. 141
Perhaps, most importantly, in distinguishing Manduley from Jones, the
majority in Manduley offered a glimpse into the narrow circumstances under
which the fortified teeth in the single-subject requirement would be revealed.
Those circumstances seem to include instances where clear evidence demonstrates
logrolling or voter confusion. 42 The court determined that, unlike Jones, the
"reasonable and commonsense relationship" between the provisions of Proposition 21
belied a logrolling scenario, where unrelated provisions were joined in order to
obtain majority support for provisions that standing alone would not have
garnered sufficient votes. 43 Similarly, the court rejected petitioners' contention
that the inclusion of the Three Strikes modifications were surreptitious and
resulted in voter confusion.'4 In so doing, the court pointed to the inclusion of
references to the changes to the Three Strikes law in the Attorney General's
summary and in the Legislative Analyst's report and followed Raven's analysis
that from such references it could be assumed that "the voters duly considered
and comprehended these materials."'
45
In addition to Chief Justice George, three other justices joined the majority
opinion in Manduley: Justice Baxter, Justice Chin, and Justice Brown.' 46 Both
Justices Baxter and Chin joined Chief Justice George in reaching a different
result in the majority opinion in Jones, as well. 147 Reading the two majority
opinions together, it appears that, for at least three of the current Justices, the
single-subject requirement will still be broadly interpreted when it comes to
comprehensive criminal justice initiatives that do not evidence obvious signs of
logrolling or attempts at voter confusion. Justice Werdegar, who joined the majority
opinion in Jones and wrote a separate concurring opinion in Manduley, also
seems to share the view that a liberal interpretation of the single-subject rule is
140. Id. at 577-79.
141. Id. at 576.
142. Id. at 579-80 n.12. The Manduley court also explained that whereas in Jones, the initiative
effectuated a fundamental shift of power from the legislative to the judicial branch, no such similar transfer of
power was proposed by Proposition 21. id. at 581. Thus, because of the court's determination on the separation
of powers issue in Manduley, the majority was postured to distinguish the language in Jones, which suggests
that a reallocation of power from one branch of government to another is a single subject that requires its own
initiative. Id.
143. Id. at 579 n. 12.
144. Manduley, 27 Cal. 4th at 580.
145. Id. (quoting Raven, 52 Cal. 3d at 349).
146. Id. at 538.
147. Jones. 21 Cal. 4th at 1142. Justice Brown joined Justice Kennard's dissenting opinion in Jones on
the grounds that review of the measure should take place after the election when there would be time for a more
deliberative judicial process. Id. at 1169-76.
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still required. In fact, her concurrence, while highlighting the collateral effects
argument eluded to by the majority concerning the Three Strikes lock-in date,
goes a step further.14 1 Justice Werdegar acknowledged that some of the crimes
added to the Three Strikes law by Proposition 21 are "doubtfully germane" to the
purpose of the initiative and were not mere collateral effects of the initiative.' °
Nonetheless, she concluded that the single-subject rule was not violated and that
"[r]equiring, in addition, that each and every provision of an initiative be clearly
and particularly related to the initiative's purposes would demand of initiative
proposers a degree of precision unrealistic in the drafting of measures effectively
reforming California's complicated body of statutory law." 5'
I submit that article 1I, section 8(d) of the California Constitution justifiably
requires that those proposing to reform a complicated body of statutory law have
at least the skills necessary to ensure that all provisions clearly and particularly
relate to the initiative's purpose and the commonsense to understand that, where
unrelated provisions require reform, a separate initiative is the proper mechanism
for such changes. Reacting to Justice Werdegar's willingness to overlook unrelated
provisions and relax the standard requiring some sort of nexus between the
various provisions of an initiative, I feel a bit like the fish in Dr. Seuss's The Cat
in the Hat in the passage where the cat is engaging in a game he calls "Up-Up-Up
with a fish!"' Like many things in life that can be reduced to lessons we learned
when we were very young, the lesson for the cat, and the children watching him,
in this passage is not to attempt to accomplish too many tricks at once. The
single-subject rule should be interpreted to reinforce this same lesson in the
initiative world. Instead, Justice Werdegar's allowance of the cat (the initiative
proposer) to throw one or two or more unrelated provisions into an already
complicated balancing act may just result in someone landing on his or her
head-to say nothing of the fish landing in a pot.
In a very different concurring opinion, recently appointed Justice Moreno not
only diverged from the majority and Justice Werdegar in interpreting the single-
subject rule standard; he also offered some enlightenment on how he might
148. Mandulev, 27 Cal. 4th at 584 (Werdegar, J., concurring).
149. Id.
150. Id. (disagreeing with the majority that just because juveniles and gangs sometimes commit certain
offenses, their inclusion as strikes is germane to the purpose of Proposition 21).
151. Id.
152. DR. SEUSS, THE CAT IN THE HAT 18-22 (Random House 1957).
"Look at me! Look at me! Look at me NOW! It is fun to have fun But you have to know how.
I can hold up the cup And the milk and the cake! I can hold up these books! And the fish on a
rake! I can hold the toy ship And a little toy man! And look! With my tail I can hold a red
fan! I can fan with the fan As I hop on the ball! But that is not all. Oh, no. That is not all. ."
That is what the cat said ... Then he fell on his head! He came down with a bump From up
there on the ball. And Sally and I, we saw ALL the things fall! And our fish came down, too.
He fell into a pot! He said, "Do I like this? Oh no! I do not. This is not a good game," Said
our fish as he lit. "No, I do not like it, Not one little bit."
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assess single-subject rule challenges in the future.'53 In the tradition of Justice
Mosk, it seems that Justice Moreno may embrace the functionally-related test or
some hybrid test, which has yet to be fully articulated or adopted but is more
stringent than the current reasonably-germane test for assessing compliance with
the single-subject rule."" In a thorough opinion recounting the history of the
court's treatment of the single-subject requirement, as well as scholarly suggestions for
its reform, Justice Moreno questioned the court's adherence to the rule first
announced in Perry v. Jordan:'55 the single-subject rule for initiatives should be
examined based on the same standard as the single subject-rule for legislation.56
Interestingly, in his first initiative opinion as a California Supreme Court justice,
Justice Moreno opened his concurring opinion with cautionary words about the
complexity of the initiative process and called for a more strict construction of
the single-subject rule.'57
Pointing out that the single-subject rule for initiatives was added to the California
Constitution in large part to avoid "information overload and voter confusion" and
recognizing that the constraints on the initiative process, including a lack of
deliberative process and inability for the electorate to propose modifications to
qualified initiatives, Justice Moreno made a strong argument that a different
standard should be employed for single-subject challenges to initiative measures."'
Significantly, Justice Moreno referred to Raven and Brosnahan H as examples of
cases which blindly follow the "liberally interpreted 'reasonably germane' test"
and "come close to rendering the single-subject rule meaningless."'59 Instead of this
liberal construction, Justice Moreno urged the creation of a test developed around
the objects of the single-subject rule: namely, avoidance of voter confusion and
logrolling.'O In formulating such a test, Justice Moreno acknowledged the suggestion
of Professors Lowenstein and Uelmen that some public understanding
component be examined, as well as the suggestion of the California Commission
on Campaign Financing that courts confronted with a single-subject rule
challenge inquire as to "whether a 'reasonable voter' would be 'surprised' to
learn that a specific provision being challenged was included in the initiative."','
153. Manduley, 27 Cal. 4th at 585-92 (Moreno, J., concurring).
154. Id. at 589.
155. 34 Cal. 2d 87 (1949).
156. Manduley, 27 Cal. 4th at 586 (Moreno, J., concurring).
157. This observation and position are particularly interesting in light of comments Justice Moreno
made in his Senate Judiciary Committee hearing during his federal court confirmation process for his prior
position as a United States District Court Judge. Upon his appointment to the California Supreme Court, the
Sacramento Bee quoted Justice Moreno during the Senate hearings and painted a picture of a jurist who would
likely be extremely deferential (to the point of presuming constitutionality) to initiative statutes and constitutional
amendments. Claire Cooper, Latino Jurist is Named to State Supreme Court, SACRAMENTO BEE, Sept. 27,
2001, at Al.
158. Manduley, 27 Cal. 4th at 586 (Moreno, J., concurring).
159. Id. at 586-87.
160. Id. at 588.
161. Id.
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To make either a determination of public understanding or the expectations of the
reasonable voter, Justice Moreno would require that the provisions of the
initiative must all be encompassed within a reasonably specific title and162
summary. Justice Moreno found that the appellate court case California Trial
Lawyers Association v. Eu,"' in which an insurance-related initiative was
removed in a pre-election single-subject challenge, appropriately applied the
more stringent reasonably-germane test that he contemplates.'6
Applying the more stringent relational standard to Proposition 21, Justice
Moreno concluded that the amendments to the Three Strikes law did not meet the
test."' Examining first the title and summary, Justice Moreno noted that
"[n]othing in the title . . . would have placed voters on notice that it would be
amending the Three Strikes law, nor that some of the amendments would have
only an incidental connection with juvenile or gang-related crime."' 66 Second,
Justice Moreno rejected the majority assumption that a passing reference in the
Attorney General's summary and a reference in the Legislative Analyst's summary
were sufficient to avoid voter confusion as to the contents of an initiative. 167
Instead of taking an idealized view of voter preparedness, his test takes into
account the average voter and concludes that "[t]he less . . . we enforce the
single-subject rule, the more we are compelled to rely on implausible assumptions
about voters' understanding of a ballot measure's intricacies."'' 68 Finally, Justice
Moreno looked to evidence of potential logrolling and found that the presence of
a separate circulating initiative to narrow the list of strikes under the Three
Strikes law might have suggested that proponents of Proposition 21 sought to
tack a controversial expansion of the Three Strikes law onto a popular anti-juveile-rim ..... 69
juvenile-crime initiative. Thus, based on Justice Moreno's opinion, a relational
test emerges that examines three questions for determining whether an initiative
embraces a single subject: (1) whether the title and summary reflect all provisions
contained in the initiative such that voters have notice as to the contents of the
initiative; (2) whether all provisions are explained adequately in the summary
and other ballot pamphlet information such that an average voter would be aware
of the provisions contained in the initiative, and (3) whether there is any
evidence, direct or implied, of logrolling. Despite finding none of these three
parts satisfied by Proposition 21, Justice Moreno nonetheless found that the
initiative satisfied the single-subject rule.'7
162. Id.
163. 200 Cal. App. 3d 351 (3d Dist. 1988).
164. Manduley, 27 Cal. 4th at 588-89 (Moreno, J., concurring).
165. Id. at 589-91.
166. Id. at 590.
167. Id. at 590-91.
168. Id. at591.
169. Id.
170. Manduley, 27 Cal. 4th at 591.
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Significantly, Justice Moreno rested his concurrence instead on the functionally-
related test, proposed by Justice Manuel in his dissent in Schmitz v. Younger,7'
adopted by Justice Mosk in his dissent in Brosnahan I," and generally perceived
to be a more stringent test. In so doing, Justice Moreno determined that an initiative
might also separately pass constitutional muster by satisfying this requirement
that its various measures are "'reasonably interrelated and interdependent, forming
an interlocking "package" designed to accomplish the initiative's purpose.'"' 73 In
the case of Proposition 21, Justice Moreno pointed to the symbiotic relationship
between section 1732.6 of the Welfare and Institutions Code and sections 667.5
and 1192.7 of the Penal Code. 4 Because the determination of whether a minor
would be committed to the Youth Authority or to prison under Proposition 21
requires a reference to both the relevant Welfare and Institutions Code section
and the Penal Code sections, Justice Moreno found an interlocking, functional
relationship between the provisions being amended by the initiative.
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VI. DRAFTING COMPREHENSIVE CRIMINAL JUSTICE
INITIATIVES IN THE FUTURE
The good news for initiative proponents seeking to draft comprehensive
criminal justice initiatives, or those on any other subject of public concern, is that
the reasonably-germane test has been reaffirmed by both Jones and Manduley.
Unless Justice Moreno is able to sway some of his colleagues to revisit the functionally-
related test or to look more closely at the recommendations of scholars and
commentators concerning a reasonable voter test, the single-subject standard will
continue to be a deferential one that requires only provisions that relate to one
another sufficiently to formulate a common purpose or theme. The bad news is
that the court does seem to be examining initiative measures more closely for
single-subject violations, and there is an increased willingness to undertake such
reviews prior to the election.
Based on both Manduley and Jones, drafters and advocates need to be aware
that title (both the title provided by the drafters and the one assigned by the
Attorney General's Office) and summary will be scrutinized when examining an
initiative for compliance with the single-subject rule. Both cases considered the
information provided in the Official Title and Summary when assessing whether
the measure would be understood to the electorate as embracing a single subject."' In
contrast, Raven did not even reference the Attorney General's title in its opinion,
171. 21 Cal. 3d 90, 100 (1978) (Manuel, J., dissenting).
172. 31 Cal. 3d 1, 9 (1982) (Mosk, J., dissenting).
173. Manduley, 27 Cal. 4th at 589 (Moreno, J., concurring) (quoting Amador Valley Joint Union High
Sch. Dist. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 22 Cal. 3d 208, 231 (1978)).
174. ld. at591.
175. Id.
176. Id. at 580; Jones, 21 Cal. 4th at 1150.
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and the limited discussion of voter confusion in that case was quickly dismissed
by pointing out that a full legislative analysis and ballot arguments were
presented.' There is an assumption in Raven, without further inquiry, that the
voters must have "considered and comprehended" these provided materials.' In
his concurrence in Manduley, Justice Moreno seems unwilling to settle for
making such an unrealistic assumption.'79
Moreover, while not the law presently, the "reasonable voter" test proposed
by the California Commission on Campaign Financing in its report a decade ago
may find a place in future interpretations of the rule.'O Professor Uelmen
discusses this "reasonable voter" test and indicates that the third part of the test is
similar to Lowenstein's more subjective "public understanding" test, first introduced
by Lowenstein in 1983 but never expressly adopted by the California Supreme
Court. '8 It is possible that some form of these tests, which both incorporate an
examination of the public perception of the term "subject" in cases involving
single-subject rule challenges, may be employed by the courts in the future.
Drafters of future initiatives also need to be aware of the Speaker's
Commission on the California Initiative Process Final Report which was issued
on March 4, 2002. Although it makes very modest recommendations, it does
suggest changes to the single-subject requirement in the form of an amendment
to article II, section 8(d) of the California Constitution as follows:
An initiative measure embracing more than one subject may not be
submitted to the electors or have any effect. All of a measure's
provisions must be both functionally related and reasonably germane to
each other. The Attorney General may not prepare a title and summary
for any measure not meeting these requirements, but shall permit a proponent
to submit separate initiatives for each subject. The determination as to
whether the single subject rule has been complied with shall be subject to
expedited independent judicial review. 82
Finally, and perhaps most clearly, initiative drafters in the future must be
aware that the courts are poised to strike down initiatives that show clear
evidence of logrolling. The elimination or avoidance of this practice is often cited
as a primary reason behind the single-subject rule, and the California Supreme
Court's willingness to remove a measure from the ballot recently was the direct
result of the presentation of clear evidence of logrolling.
177. Raven, 52 Cal. 3d at 349.
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VII. CONCLUSION
This is an exciting time to be watching the California Supreme Court and its
initiative jurisprudence. It is also a time to be cautious and aware when drafting
complex, multi-faceted initiatives of the subtle changes that have taken place in
the analysis of the single-subject rule in the last several decades. While Manduley
suggests that deference to comprehensive criminal justice initiatives will still be
afforded, Jones suggests that where initiatives are presented that are in flagrant
violation of the dual purposes of the single-subject rule, they will be stricken
before reaching the electorate for a vote.

